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On 26 September 1334 Azzone Visconti, by then signore of Milan, Bergamo, 
Cremona and Vercelli, granted Milanese citizenship and exemption from 
taxation to Franceschino de Sancto Gallo of Bergamo: «tibi Franceschino nato 
quondam Fineti de Sancto Gallo de Pergamo dilecto nostro volentes de nostri 
plenitudine potestatis gratiam facere specialem… »1. The document is one of 
the fi rst surviving references by any Visconti to their plenitudo potestatis2.
The phrase, plenitudo potestatis, from modest beginnings had come to 
embody the highest papal claims. It had originated as the expression defi ning, 
in ecclesiastical government, the distinction between pope and hierarchy: 
the pope could exercise jurisdiction over the whole church, bishops only in 
their own diocese3. In terms of law, fullness of power meant that the pope was 
both highest judge and supreme legislator in the church: just as the emperor 
was lex animata so the pope was canon vivus who was above the law and 
whose will had the force of law4. Linked to his role as legislator was the pope’s 
authority to override existing law: thus Innocent III proclaimed early in the 
thirteenth century that «with the authority of our fullness of power, we can by 
right make dispensations above the law»5. It was Hostiensis who subsequently 
distinguished between everyday power (potestas ordinaria) and absolute 
power (potestas absoluta) that had to be invoked when the pope acted 
outside the law6. More extensive claims came in the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries with the confl icts of Boniface VIII’s pontifi cate, when 
papalists began to assert that the pope had full powers not only in spiritual 
but in temporal affairs. It is in this period that there appeared phrases 
such as plenitudo pontifi calis et regie potestatis, regalis sive imperialis 
dignitatis plenitudo and utriusque potestatis et iurisdictionis plenitudo7. 
By the fourteenth century plenitudo potestatis had thus acquired a truly 
awesome scope, and so the question arises by what authority Azzone and his 
descendants presumed to adopt such a prerogative for themselves.
In general terms the Visconti’s plenitude of power can be seen in the 
context of its annexation by secular sovereigns: once the phrase had become 
the customary expression for the grand claims of papal sovereignty, it began 
to exercise an attraction for other rulers. During the reign of Frederick II it 
Jane Black2
Reti Medievali Rivista, V - 2004/1 <http://www.storia.unifi .it/_RM/rivista/atti/poteri/Black.htm>
was used by the imperial chancery8 and at the beginning the next century 
all kinds of imperial documents issued by Henry VII referred to «plenitude 
of royal power»9. The phrase was used at the French court, appearing, for 
example, in Louis IX’s 1254 reforming ordonnance, which gave the king 
the right to «proclaim, change, improve, add to or curtail» the law10. Philip 
IV issued his 1303 statute against private warfare «de plenitudine regiae 
potestatis»11 and in 1315 and 1316 Louis X created peerages «de nostrae 
potestatis plenitudine»12. Plenitudo potestatis appeared too, and remarkably 
early, in documents associated with precariously established Italian signori: 
Azzone Visconti’s references to his plenitude of power were not unique. The 
Bonacolsi, for example, regularly acted on the strength of their plenitude of 
power at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Thus a concession was 
granted on 17 April 1300 to Corradino Gonzaga by Guido Bonacolsi, signore 
of Mantua, «ex suo arbitrio et potestatis plenitudine, de certa scientia»13. 
Even so dubious a ruler as Guecellone da Camino, who in 1322 had already 
lost his position as signore in Treviso, can be seen granting a tax exemption 
«de sue plenitudine potestatis et meri et mixti imperii quod sui antecessores 
habuerunt et nunc habet ipse»14. The Scaligeri likewise issued decrees and 
privileges de plenitudine potestatis. In 1324 Cangrande della Scala in a 
dispute between the commune of Bassano and Niccolò di Rovero acted, «ex 
vigore nostri arbitrii et de nostre plenitudine potestatis ex certa scientia»15. 
Again in 1328 Cangrande, «by imperial authority vicar general of Verona, 
Padua and Vicenza», expressed his wish to grant the castle of Vighizzolo to his 
loyal supporter, Spinetta Malaspina, «de nostre plenitud<ine potestatis>»16; 
and in 1331 Alberto II and Mastino II renewed a grant of tax exemption made 
earlier by Cangrande to the convent of Santa Caterina «ex nostri capitaneatus 
offi cio et de nostre plenitudine potestatis ac ex certa scientia»17.
With regard to the appropriation of plenitude of power by emerging 
signori, there is one obvious explanation: they were desperate to be seen as 
princes. Certainly the Bonacolsi’s reference to their plenitude of power at the 
turn of the century was in keeping with their notorious pretensions to absolute 
sovereignty18. Perhaps the closest analogy to the Visconti can be found in the 
regime of the Scaligeri, who were attempting to establish themselves and their 
reputation during the 1320s and 1330s. Cangrande’s success in conquering 
Verona and Vicenza had made them the most powerful family in North 
Italy and himself «the grandest, the most powerful and the richest tyrant 
in Lombardy from Azzolino da Romano to the present day»19; «quodcunque 
voluit, obtinuit», it was said20. Cangrande was as skilful in creating a princely 
image as he was in imposing his authority by force and diplomacy. Since the 
end of the thirteenth century the Scaligeri had been attempting to disguise 
their parvenu origins by a series of aristocratic marriages and titles of 
nobility21 and Cangrande fostered an image which put him on a par with 
the greatest princes. His spectacular entourage was unique in contemporary 
Italy22. The amazing displays of pageantry and hospitality which he laid on 
in 1327 and 1328 for the coronation of Lewis IV in Milan and the capture of 
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Padua outshone even the Emperor23. By the mid-1320s the Trevisans were 
predicting «within a year he will be king of Italy»24; and so convinced had the 
Scaligeri become of their own authority, that Cangrande’s successor, Mastino 
II, ordered a jewelled crown to be made in preparation for his coronation as 
King of Lombardy25. The Scaligeri’s assertion of the traditional papal and 
imperial prerogative of plenitude of power is perfectly consistent with such 
image-making26.
Azzone too was keen to foster an image of authority not least because his 
family had suffered such a reverse of fortune in the 1320s. Cities which had 
previously come under Visconti rule, or least protection, had withdrawn their 
allegiance: Piacenza, Lodi, Alessandria, Tortona, and even Milan itself for 
a few weeks in 1322, had rebelled. Bergamo, Novara, Cremona and Bobbio 
abandoned the regime in 1327 when the Emperor Lewis IV turned to the 
Visconti’s Ghibelline enemies and Galeazzo I was ousted from Milan for the 
second time, ending up in prison with the rest of his family. On Galeazzo’s 
death in 1328 Visconti fortunes were truly at their nadir. Azzone would have 
to pay a huge sum to Lewis27 for a new imperial vicariate in Milan, but that 
would be just the beginning of his recovery. Nevertheless by the time he died 
in 1339, he had made himself master of Lombardy and signore of Milan, 
Piacenza, Cremona, Como, Vercelli, Novara, Brescia, Bergamo and Lodi. The 
regime he created, like those of other signori, was not just based on strength 
and diplomacy: Azzone launched a programme to transform the Visconti into 
monarchs. This agenda he bequeathed to his successors: from that point, 
despite setbacks, the Visconti never deviated from their key ambition to 
establish themselves as princes in Lombardy and beyond. 
Azzone’s activities in this context, as is well known, were varied and 
energetic. Like the della Scala he sponsored festivities on an extravagant 
scale28. He initiated a building progamme to glorify Milan which included a 
palace for himself which left people, in the words of Fiamma, «thunderstruck 
in ecstatic admiration»29. Giotto decorated the new great hall with an 
impressive fresco in which Azzone was depicted taking his place among the 
leaders of the world’s great nations: Hercules and Hector, Attila, Aeneas and 
Charlemagne30. His quest for princely status extended to his coinage: Azzone 
had a series of at least twenty-fi ve coins minted in Milan of ever increasing 
fl amboyance: he began by introducing his own initials; then he dispensed 
with the emperor’s name, spelling out his own in full; fi nally he ordered the 
Visconti viper to be substituted for the cross of the Milanese commune31. As he 
acquired other cities, he continued to publicize his domination in regal style, 
through personalized local coinage32.
Azzone’s references to his plenitudo potestatis might appear simply to 
express the desire he shared with other signori to parrot the language and 
trappings of monarchy. But closer comparison between Visconti documents 
and those of other regimes reveals signifi cant differences. Whereas Azzone 
and his successors relied confi dently on plenitude of power in itself to 
express their authority and give force to their edicts, the Bonacolsi, Scaligeri 
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and Caminesi preferred the added security of established formulae. Guido 
Bonacolsi, in the example cited above from 1300, authorized Corradino 
Gonzaga to acquire the lands of the imprisoned Bonaventurino Zanicalli 
«ex suo arbitrio et potestatis plenitudine»; and this was the form of words 
followed in his other concessions33. As jurisdiction handed from commune to 
signore, arbitrium implied wide executive and legislative powers and was the 
essence of the authority conceded to Guido by the general council of Mantua 
in 129934. Again in 1322 Guecellone da Camino, granted tax exemption «de 
sue plenitudine potestatis et meri et mixti imperii quod sui antecessores 
habuerunt et nunc habet ipse»35; he had received «merum et iustum imperium 
et arbitrium generale secundum eius beneplacitum» from the general council 
of Treviso in 131336. Similarly in 1324 Cangrande overruled the statutory limits 
for appeal, «ex vigore nostri arbitrii et de nostre plenitudine potestatis»37; 
he had been expressly given arbitrium by the general councils of Vicenza 
and Verona back in 131238. In granting the castle of Vighizzolo to Spinetta 
Malaspina, the renowned and experienced notary and scholar, Benzo da 
Alessandria, drew up a diploma which was couched in similar terms: «vigore 
arbitriorum nostrorum et de nostri plenitudine potestatis»; the charter of 
Alberto and Mastino endowing the convent of Santa Caterina in 1331 too was 
made «ex nostri capitaneatus offi cio et de nostre plenitudine potestatis»39. On 
the other hand, when Azzone and his successors Luchino and Giovanni issued 
grants using plenitude of power, they routinely omitted to seek any additional 
supporting authority. Thus Azzone says in 1334 simply, «we wish to grant a 
special favour to Franceschino de Sancto Gallo from our plenitude of power 
(volentes de nostri plenitudine potestatis gratiam facere specialem»40. In his 
1336 confi rmation of the right of Molotono de Muzzo of Bergamo to collect 
duties, he annulled any contrary concessions «eciam de nostre plenitudine 
potestatis»41. In 1339 Giovanni and Luchino conceded exemption from the 
salt tax to the village of Romano solely «de nostra liberalitate et plenitudine 
potestatis»42; and in 1343 they issued their decree on justice simply «de nostrae 
plenitudine potestatis»43. This formula was identical to that used by emperors, 
whose plenitude of power was deemed suffi cient in itself to provide their 
commands with all necessary force. Thus in 1329 Lewis IV granted Azzone the 
vicariate «ex certa scientia de nostre plenitudine potestatis»44. Such usage by 
the early Visconti, even more audacious than that of other signori, could be 
interpreted as a statement of their unique monarchical ideology.
Assumption of plenitudo potestatis by parvenu dynasties such as 
the Visconti raised diffi cult questions that did not confront established 
sovereign powers. The way in which the emperor, the pope and the kings of 
France expressed their prerogative was a declaration in itself of the nature 
of their authority: papal plenitude was described as «plenitudo pontifi calis 
et regie potestatis»45, «plenitudo ecclesiasticae potestatis»46, «apostolicae 
plenitudo potestatis»47; or it could be explained in a short phrase: «plenitudo 
potestatis quam habet quia est vicarius Christi»48. The emperors spoke of 
their «imperatorie plenitudo potestatis»49 or, more frequently in the early 
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fourteenth century, of their «plenitudo potestatis regie»50. The French kings, 
too, issued laws and privileges «de plenitudine regie potestatis»51. But papal, 
apostolic, royal or imperial power were levels of authority far surpassing 
anything to which petty signori could lay claim and there was no comparable 
idiom with which the early Visconti could encapsulate their status. Issuing 
decrees or concessions simply de plenitudine potestatis therefore left the 
theoretical basis of the early Visconti’s pretensions in limbo. 
It has been suggested that plenitudo potestatis was an aspect of the 
imperial vicariate acquired by so many signori in the fourtenth century52. 
Such diplomas, however, did not include the concession of plenitudo 
potestatis. Azzone himself simply received «merum et mixtum imperium et 
omnem iurisdictionem et exercitium»53. Moreover there is the problem that 
between 1329 and 1355 none of the Visconti possessed an imperial title54. 
The diplomatic situation in which Azzone had acquired his vicariate had 
been uniquely complex, with the result that his title was annulled almost 
as soon as it had been acquired. His motives for laying out a large sum to 
Lewis IV for the title were diplomatic and military: in early 1329 he wanted to 
forestall an imperial invasion and re-enter Milan. But the anxiety which this 
had aroused at the papal court and the consequent renewal of the interdict 
and excommunication, together with the threat of a French invasion, had led 
Azzone to re-open negotiations with Pope John XXII and fi nally to submit 
to his authority. Thus it happened that the confi rmation of the imperial 
diploma on 23 September 1329 took place at the very moment when the curia 
had accepted his return to obedience (15 September) and by 26 November 
Azzone had offi cially accepted an apostolic vicariate instead55. Given his rapid 
volte-face in favour of the papacy, it is unlikely he harboured any conscious 
intention to use an imperial diploma as the foundation for a claim to plenitude 
of power. 
There is, on the other hand, the possibility that the Visconti believed 
plenitude of power had been granted to them by their subjects. The surviving 
documents of Azzone’s election to the position of dominus in the various 
communes he seized do not specifi cally mention plenitude of power; 
nevertheless, they appear to encapsulate its central feature, i.e. authority 
above the law. In Milan the general council agreed to hand over to him all 
their legislative powers and the right «wholly or partially to annul, revoke, 
add to, curtail, change, supplement, correct, interpret and clarify the laws of 
Milan» as he saw fi t56. Similarly in the proemium to the new statutes issued 
in Como later that year, the legislative powers of the commune were expressly 
handed over: namely «the unrestricted and universal power (arbitrium) and 
authority (bailiam) to act… over, against, beyond or outside the terms of the 
statutes of the city; to infl ict punishment and proscription; to make laws; to 
disburse communal revenue and to issue statutes, provisions and privileges». 
To reinforce these powers, it was added that «whatever the signore himself 
orders or decrees by letter or other means is to be considered law and must 
be obeyed by [the people] as a permanent enactment»57 in Vercelli (the only 
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other of Azzone’s acquisitions for which there survives the complete record of 
his election) it was agreed too that «whatever Azzone ordains regarding the 
city shall be authoritative, binding and the law of Vercelli» and that he was 
to enjoy the same legislative powers of the commune itself, «notwithstanding 
any statutes, ordinances, provisions, counsel or legislation to the contrary»58. 
Again there is no express mention in any of these of plenitudo potestatis. But 
other sources suggest that it was a prerogative linked to popular sovereignty 
and transferred in accordance with the lex regia from people to prince. Cynus 
of Pistoia in his Commentary on the Codex, composed c. 1312-1314, concluded 
that the emperor enjoyed plenitude of power before his coronation by the 
pope: his authority came from his election by the German princes through the 
lex regia as a result of which he enjoyed the rights associated with plenitudo 
potestatis59. Writing in the 1320s, Marsilius of Padua, too, saw the source of 
plenitude of power in the people (the so-called «human legislator»)60. These 
authors were echoing an earlier tradition, articulated in the late twelfth century 
by the canonist, Huguccio, who wrote: «all authority to pass laws and canons 
was granted by the people to the emperor and by the church to the pope and 
from this is understood to have originated their plenitude of power»61.
Usage in other signorial regimes, too, shows that plenitude of power was 
thought to come from the people. Members of the general council of Mantua, 
ratifying Guido Bonacolsi’s expenditure on buildings in 1308, declared that 
he was acting «from his arbitrium and from the plenitude of power solemnly 
conceded and bestowed on him by the commune of Mantua»62. Even after 
he had been granted a vicariate, the same assumption was made by Rinaldo 
Bonacolsi in 1324: as imperial vicar of Modena and Mantua, he conceded to 
the Gonzaga family the right to buy certain properties, «acting on the authority 
(arbitrium) and plenitude of power he exercised in those areas, [prerogatives] 
transferred to him by the communes, people and councils of these cities»63. 
There is a further example from Modena of a commune’s expressly granting 
plenitude of power to its new signori. In 1336, when Obizzo and Niccolò 
d’Este took over the city, a statute was passed appointing them «perpetui 
et generales domini civitatis». Along with an extensive list of executive and 
legislative powers, it was decreed that «the area ruled by the commune of 
Modena together with full authority (baylia), plenitude of power and control 
is to be handed over to the two signori by the commune of Modena»64. Finally, 
Mastino della Scala referred in 1338 to the two prerogatives of «plenitude of 
power and control (arbitrium), both of which,» he said, «we have the honour 
to possess in the city, district and diocese of Verona with God’s mercy and 
through the statutes of the commune and people of Verona»65. Whether the 
Visconti had any notion that their own plenitudo potestatis came from the 
people when they fi rst began to employ the term in the 1330s and 1340s is not 
made clear. But, as has been seen above, circumstances then meant that the 
prerogative was unlikely to have been associated with the imperial vicariate. 
On the other hand, the idea of a link between plenitude of power and popular 
sovereignty certainly had contemporary currency.
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New possibilities arose when in 1355 Emperor Charles IV granted a 
vicariate to Matteo, Bernabò and Galeazzo, who had assumed joint rule of the 
Visconti dominions the previous year. The diploma still did not specifi cally 
include plenitude of power but was much fuller than earlier vicariates, 
granting «plenam, meram, et liberam ac omnimodam liberalem et gladii 
potestatem et iurisdictionem nec non merum, absolutum et mixtum imperium 
vice et auctoritate nostris et sacri imperii». They were given control over 
the punishment of criminals, imposition of fi nes, hearing of civil cases and 
of appeals which normally went to the emperor, the power to raise taxes 
and punish rebels against the empire; in short, they were to possess «all the 
superiority and jurisdiction» which the emperor himself enjoyed66. Despite 
the seeming prestige their new status, the brothers at fi rst continued to use 
the title of dominus generalis granted by their subject communes67, and only 
gradually began to refer to their new vicarial position in offi cial documents68; 
from 1360 both Bernabò and Galeazzo regularly called themselves only vicars 
general in their acts and correspondence69. These years saw increasingly 
frequent references to plenitude of power from the Visconti, but because of the 
dual nature of their authority, both popular and imperial, the source of their 
plenitudo remained ambiguous. Evidence suggests that their own conception of 
its derivation mirrored their initial hesitation and subsequent growing reliance 
on their new title. In 1357, writing under their traditional title «generales 
domini», Bernabò and Galeazzo annulled a grant of land made by Matteo I 
and gave it to one of their followers, Giordano Clerico de Clericis «ex nostre 
plenitudine potestatis tanquam domini Mediolani»70, indicating that plenitude 
of power was perceived as coming from the commune. In a second example from 
1366, Bernabò, writing as «imperialis vicarius generalis», decreed that his wife, 
Regina della Scala, should be granted assorted lands «de nostra et imperialis 
potestatis plenitudine»71, so suggesting that he had acquired plenitude of power 
both from the commune and from the emperor as an aspect of the vicariate72. 
The two documents imply that by the 1350s and 1360s the Visconti had become 
aware that the origins of their plenitude of power was a problem which had to 
be addressed. Uncertainty continued, however: indeed the vicariate proved a 
precarious source of authority. It had been granted for life to the brothers and 
their heirs, «but only so long as they maintained their loyalty and obedience 
to the empire»73, and when the new emperor, Wenceslas, fell out with them in 
1372, he withdrew the privilege. This did not stop Bernabò, Galeazzo or his son, 
Giangaleazzo, who succeeded in 1378, from continuing to use the title, nor from 
asserting plenitude of power. But Giangaleazzo, if not Bernabò, was suffi ciently 
disturbed by his anomalous status to procure a renewal of the vicariate in 
138074. The importance Giangaleazzo attached to this offi ce can be measured 
by the fact that Wenceslas was able to use the conditional nature of the title to 
extract multiple payments for its continuance75. But again, there was never an 
express grant of plenitude of power.
The omission was fi nally remedied after 1395 once Giangaleazzo had been 
made duke of Milan. The solemnity of the coronation and splendour of the 
Jane Black8
Reti Medievali Rivista, V - 2004/1 <http://www.storia.unifi .it/_RM/rivista/atti/poteri/Black.htm>
celebrations were designed to emphasise the momentous signifi cance of the 
dynasty’s elevation to permanent sovereignty76. But apart from the right to 
create fi efs, the 1395 diploma itself did not clearly spell out what powers were 
conferred: Giangaleazzo and his heirs were simply to enjoy the rights and status 
of imperial dukes and princes77. The diploma did not satisfy Giangaleazzo, who 
insisted on further titles over the next two years. The most signifi cant was the 
diploma granted on 13 October 139678, whose purpose was threefold: to extend 
the ducal title beyond the confi nes of Milan, to make detailed arrangements 
for the succession and to create the new title of Count of Pavia. But in 
addition to these practical arrangements, the new diploma explicitly granted 
Giangaleazzo plenitudo potestatis: thenceforth it was to be understood that 
the duke was entitled «to manage, discharge and administer (gerere, facere 
et expedire) in the duchy… that which we and [other] kings of the Romans 
and emperors have the power to manage, discharge and administer even from 
plenitude of power»79. There is no doubt that the diplomas were in practice 
drawn up by Giangaleazzo and his chancery, refl ecting his own ambitions. 
It was joked at the time that Wenceslas had provided him with a blank 
parchment, complete with imperial seal, for him to fi ll in as he pleased80. The 
desire for an express grant of plenitude of power emphasized the misgivings 
surrounding Visconti pretensions hitherto, doubts of which Giangaleazzo 
must have been conscious. Thus he was quick to broadcast the authorization 
he now had for employing plenitude of power: in the charter issued to the 
university of Piacenza on 1 January 1399 he wrote, «since naturally we wish to 
enrich our ducal monarchy with learning and virtue», he was minded to have 
the university set up «from our plenitude of power, as conceded to us and our 
heirs by the imperial offi ce (a Caesarea dignitate)»81.  
*   *   *
When Azzone Visconti fi rst began to assume plenitude of power, it was not 
that he was taking advantage of the latest legal opinion: contemporary jurists 
still worked on the understanding that such a prerogative was associated with 
the unchallenged sovereignty of popes, emperors and kings. It was the signori 
who took the initiative, leaving lawyers the task of incorporating their claims 
into a new legal framework. But it was a gradual process.
Albericus de Rosate, the most eminent jurist in Azzone’s circle82, was one 
of the few Italian lawyers to examine the meaning of plenitude of power in 
a secular context. Plenitudo potestatis allowed the emperor the luxury of 
acting with legality yet outside the law. In his analysis he listed the various 
means by which the emperor could confi scate property: he could do so by 
passing a general law which might lead to the loss of property (for example, 
through taxation); or through a court judgement (sententia) or a contract; or 
by exercising his judicial authority and issuing a fi ne or a court order. None of 
these acts required the ruler to circumvent the law. Finally he could do so in a 
rescript; but rescripts were not valid if they were contra ius, ius meaning not 
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merely law in general but individual rights83. The emperor could not dispose 
of his subjects’ property by this kind of executive order «unless he were 
willing to use plenitudo potestatis»84. Albericus conceded that «a rescript 
which completely ignores or gravely prejudices the rights of another should 
not be granted»85, but allowed that, with plenitudo potestatis, the emperor 
could act at will. Albericus thus clarifi ed the theory of plenitude of power 
from the point of view of secular authority and was responsible, together with 
Cynus de Pistoia, for bringing into Italy a concept of monarchy which had 
been suggested by French lawyers such as Petrus Bellaperticus and Jacobus 
de Ravannis86. Albericus composed his commentaries on the Digest and Codex 
before 1345 and by that time the Visconti and other signori had long been 
using plenitudo in their offi cial acts. And yet his discussions focus wholly on 
emperor and pope: nowhere does he suggest that the Visconti were endowed 
with plenitudo. On the other hand his confi rmation that plenitudo potestatis 
was a tool for allowing secular rulers to get round established laws and rights 
had immense potential.
The Milanese jurist, Signorolus de Homodeis (d. 1371), was just as much 
involved in local affairs as his contemporary Albericus during the years after 
1330 when the Visconti were establishing their regime. From 1330 to 1362 he 
was a member of the Milanese Collegium Iurisconsultorum; in 1351 he was 
appointed by Giovanni Visconti to help revise the statutes of Milan and he was 
invited by Galeazzo II to a chair at the University of Pavia when it was fi rst 
re-established in 136187. Whereas Albericus was unwilling to break the mould 
and remained diffi dent about the monarchical pretensions of the Visconti, 
Signorolus appears to have enthusiastically embraced the new world of the 
signori. Signorolus, indeed, appears to have been the fi rst of the Milanese 
lawyers to take the decisive step and give the Visconti the full role of prince 
in their own dominions. In one instance he was asked to give an opinion in a 
dispute between Parma and Cremona over customs duties88. A particular aspect 
of the case was to be judged by their joint Visconti ruler; Signorolus concluded 
that, when it comes to carrying out the will of the signore, «what pleases the 
prince has the force of law, as it says in the Institutes»89. In 1343, fearful lest 
rebels should fi nd refuge within his own lands, Luchino Visconti issued the 
order which appears as the fi rst law in the Antiqua ducum Mediolani decreta. 
It takes the form of a letter to the «potestati, sapientibus et communi» of 
Piacenza, stating that any criminal or person proscribed in a Milanese 
court should be considered such in Piacenza too. Appended to the decree is 
a list of the other communes who received the same letter, a cumbersome 
procedure which refl ected the fact that each city had made its own pact with 
the Visconti and was treated as a separate entity, their interrelationship 
being left undefi ned90. Thus Luchino was not, in this instance, attempting to 
legislate for all his territories as a unit but was showing his respect for the 
traditional independence of the communes. Signorolus, on the other hand, 
was more sympathetic to the Visconti’s overall aspirations of to be considered 
territorial princes. In a consilium composed some time after Luchino’s death, 
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he debated the status of this injunction. «The letter» he insisted, «should 
be seen as a general law» and not merely as a communal statute. «The late 
revered Luchino determined that lands subject to his rule, which in other ways 
enjoyed separate jurisdiction, should join together in respect of proscription 
and have the benefi t of unity with each other»91. 
It is in the context of conceding a quasi-royal position to the Visconti that 
Signorolus’s acceptance of their claim to plenitudo potestatis can be seen. 
When Giovanni Visconti approved the sale of a tax farm «ex plenitudine 
potestatis sue» Signorolus was happy to support Giovanni’s prerogative in the 
course of the resulting dispute92. A tax issued on such a basis overrode, in his 
opinion, the right to exemption of a particular religious house. First of all he 
demonstrated the existence of a just cause, the accepted precondition whenever 
individual rights were to be undermined by plenitude of power. In this instance 
peace and security had to be protected in unhappy times by mercenary troops, 
who needed to be paid; it was only fair that, as prime benefi ciaries of defence 
expenditure, religious houses should contribute93. Giovanni’s concession of 
a tax farm, being based on plenitude of power used with just cause, had the 
effect of annulling the well founded privileges of the convent. In such ways the 
Visconti claim to plenitudo potestatis fi rst began to be acknowledged in the 
legal profession, a recognition which for Signorolus went hand-in-hand with 
the notion that the Visconti were endowed with imperial privileges. For him 
that idea was unconnected to Charles IV’s vicariate, which was not granted 
until after the deaths of Luchino and Giovanni. His thought appears rather 
to have paralleled that of his contemporary Bartolus whose concept of civitas 
sibi princeps owed its existence, similarly, not to formal diplomas but to the 
practical necessities of governing independent city-states94.
By the time Baldus accepted an invitation from Giangaleazzo Visconti to 
lecture at Pavia in 1390, he was Italy’s most renowned jurist and his presence 
there until his death in 1400 brought prestige to the new university and to 
the regime. His eminence gave him a redoubtable independence and, though 
willing to support Giangaleazzo where possible, his reputation was such that 
he did not feel obliged to temper his opinions. In his writings the essential 
paradox at the heart of plenitudo potestatis emerged. Plenitude of power 
had always had two sides: it symbolized, on the one hand, unique supremacy 
and was employed in this sense by the emperor and other heads of state. 
But at the same time plenitude of power was the means by which a ruler 
could override existing laws and rights. It was both a badge of sovereignty 
and an instrument of injustice. The inherent contradictions are refl ected in 
Baldus’s ambivalent attitude to plenitude of power: he recognized that it was 
an impressive attribute of monarchy but distrusted its role in government. 
Given his punctiliousness, it is perhaps not surprising that he was suspicious 
of a prerogative which could be used as a means of by-passing established 
law. He contrasted behaving with propriety with acting from plenitude of 
power: «those things are presumed to be done properly (decenter) and not 
from plenitude of power»95. One of his emphatic and much quoted defi nitions 
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of plenitudo reads: «plenitude of power is plenitude of authority (arbitrium), 
subject to no compulsion and limited by none of the rules of public law». This 
lack of restraint had alarming consequences: «The prince is able to favour the 
less fair over the fairer and the worse over the better; since he is not bound 
by anything, he can please himself»96. Much had changed in the decades since 
Albericus assumed that plenitude of power belonged solely to established 
sovereigns. According to Baldus it made little difference whether plenitudo 
was claimed de iure or de facto97: «since plenitude of power beyond normal 
territorial jurisdiction is based on entitlement,» he said, «it must have some 
sort of privilege to stand on, but that could be either an imperial grant or a 
long standing custom»98. Plenitude of power was a phrase which was thrown 
about by all and sundry: «All the Lombard signori» , he wrote, «routinely 
use the phrase “de plenitudine potestatis” relying on some kind of theory and 
established practice and acting as if they had a right to the expression and its 
reality; and, [saying so] without prejudice to the law, I do consider that their 
words should be trusted. After all it is hardly likely that they would use an 
expression with no foundation»99. For his own part, he wrote, «I have always 
accepted plenitude of power and regarded the assertions of all those signori 
as legitimate»100. Baldus’s hostility to the way in which plenitude of power was 
being abused was nowhere more starkly revealed than in his opinion of the 
grant of two castra made by Emperor Charles IV to the Malaspina family, 
later confi rmed by Wenceslas. These lands were not, according to evidence 
submitted by the original owner, the emperor’s to give and, as Baldus pointed 
out, «if one noble seizes the holding of another on imperial authority, [the law 
says] he has to return it together with any revenues which have accrued»101. 
The Malaspina concession was therefore invalid: «for the emperor may not, 
simply on his own authority, give permission for someone to expel a just 
and lawful owner»102. The diffi culty was that the grant had been made ex 
plenitudine potestatis. But Baldus was adamant: «it makes no difference that 
the words “de plenitudine potestatis” were used; for plenitude of power means 
plenitude of good and laudable power, not that which is disgraceful and 
tyrannical… This thoughtless and abusive device, which princes utilize these 
days in their rescripts, should be totally eradicated from royal courts»103. The 
consilium encapsulated Baldus’s attitude to plenitude of power: in practice it 
was being used for just those «disgraceful and tyrannical» purposes that he 
had denounced. 
With regard to the Visconti, too, Baldus found it diffi cult to conceal his 
contempt for the triumph of plenitude of power over law and justice. The 
treasury had confi scated a house as payment for a debt owed by a certain 
Thomas, and Giangaleazzo had given the property «ex certa scientia et de 
plenitudine potestatis» to Benentono, a rich property owner from Piedmont. 
Subsequently a third person claimed that the house had been pledged to 
him as security for money owed and that he had effectively been robbed 
by the treasury. Baldus was confi dent that this claim was the stronger in 
law: «Benentono ought to return the house, [which Giangaleazzo gave him] 
Jane Black12
Reti Medievali Rivista, V - 2004/1 <http://www.storia.unifi .it/_RM/rivista/atti/poteri/Black.htm>
because it is universally acknowledged that “fi rst in time is stronger in 
law”»104. On Benentono’s side all that could be said was that «he possessed 
the house in good faith and with a decree from the prince; or indeed, it should 
rather be said that where a decree is involved there is no need for good faith… 
For the prince can, with cause, take someone’s property… Moreover the 
donation included the words “ex certa scientia et de plenitudine potestatis” 
and where these words are incorporated, it would be like sacrilege to disobey 
(always assuming the donor has such power)»105. Again there was right in law 
and there was plenitude of power. Baldus himself put it frankly at the end of 
the consilium: «this is a problematic case because on the one side you have 
fairness and on the other you have supreme power… I would not counsel 
in any other way because the case touches the interests of our magnifi cent 
signore and the decision rests with the Council of Justice, not with me»106. 
Baldus had stressed in his lectures that plenitudo potestatis was meant 
to be used sparingly107; but in practice it had become commonplace. The 
implications were negative: he contrasted plenitudo potestatis with plenitudo 
honestatis108. He saw the Visconti getting round established laws and rights by 
liberal use of their claim to plenitude of power, but there was no going back: 
«if anyone were to call into question the powers of the signori,» he wrote, «he 
would destroy the effectiveness [of their rule] and I would not put forward any 
such opinion because I would not want to turn the world upside-down»109. 
Whatever reservations he had about the Visconti and plenitudo, their system 
of grants, privileges and decrees now depended on its use. Baldus had to work 
within a system of government where, as he put it, «the prince, motivated by 
any objective, however trivial, can do whatever he wants from plenitude of 
power»110. 
The hundred years since the early Bonacolsi’s references to their plenitude 
of power had seen the consolidation of signorial regimes in terms of legitimacy 
and bureaucratic organization. During that time plenitudo potestatis was 
employed increasingly as one of the means by which the Visconti could impose 
their will on an existing network of rights; in the fi fteenth century plenitude 
of power would continue to fl ourish as a fundamental component of the 
government of Milan. The fi nal concession of the prerogative by Wenceslas to 
Giangaleazzo marked a key stage in the formal legitimization of Visconti rule 
but, as Baldus’s works forewarned, later lawyers would be adept at fi nding 
ways round the indiscriminate use of a tool which threatened established 
privileges and the laws of property.
13
Reti Medievali Rivista, V - 2004/1 <http://www.storia.unifi .it/_RM/rivista/atti/poteri/Black.htm>
The Visconti in the Fourteenth Century
Note
1 C. Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria dei Visconti. Documenti, vol. I, Milan 1976, p. 7. 
2 Examples of Azzone’s use of plenitudo are rare, in part because of the paucity of documents 
surviving from his rule; but the 1353 statutes of Bergamo provide another example in the 
confi rmation of the right of Molotono de Muzzo of Bergamo to collect duties on wood carried 
on sections of the Serio and Brembo rivers which Azzone had given on 15 November 1336 
«auctoritate nostra et comunis nostri Pergami et de nostre plenitudine potestatis»; at the end 
of the statute he annulled contrary laws «eciam de nostre plenitudine potestatis» (Lo Statuto di 
Bergamo del 1353, ed. G. Forgiarini, Spoleto, 1996, pp. 355-357).
3 «… in partem sollicitudinis non in plenitudinem potestatis». See R. L. Benson, «Plenitudo 
potestatis»: evolution of a formula from Gregory IV to Gratian, in Collectanea Stephan Kuttner, 
Studia Gratiana, vol. XIV, Bologna 1967, vol. IV, p. 198; J. A. Watt, The use of the term «plenitudo 
potestati» by Hostiensis, in Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval 
Canon Law, eds. S. Kuttner and J. J. Ryan, Vatican City 1965, p. 161. Benson («Plenitudo 
potestatis» cit.) cites some of the literature on the history of the term. More bibliography may be 
found in K. Pennington, Pope and Bishops: the Papal Monarchy in the Twelfth and Thirteenth 
Centuries, Philadelphia 1984.
4 Watt, The Use of the term cit., pp. 164-165.
5 «… secundum plenitudinem potestatis de iure possumus supra ius dispensare» (Benson, 
«Plenitudo potestatis» cit., p. 197, n. 7).
6 Watt, The Use of the term cit., pp. 166-168.
7 W. McCready, Papal «plenitudo potestatis» and the source of temporal authority in late 
medieval papal hierocratic theory, in “Speculum”, vol. XLVIII, 1973, p. 655. 
8 For a discussion of the early use of «plenitudo potestatis» at the imperial court see E. Schubert, 
König und Reich: Studien zur spätmittelalterlichen deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte, Göttingen 
1979, pp. 128-139. 
9 A privilege was issued in 1310 to the count of Guelderland «de plenitudine potestatis regie» to 
collect tolls, (M[onumenta] G[ermaniae] H[istorica], Legum sectio IV, Constitutiones IV pt. 1, 
nr. 429, p. 373 ); in the same year Henry VII appointed his son John, king of Bohemia, to the 
position of imperial regent «de regie plenitudine potestatis», (ibidem, nr. 444, p. 389); in 1311, 
he announced laws quashing the reprisals and banishments which had been passed against his 
enemies in Lombardy and Tuscany «ex nostre plenitudine potestatis», (ibidem, nr. 563, p. 523); 
in 1311 the archbishop of Mainz was restored to certain rights near Dietfort «de plenitudine regie 
potestatis», (ibidem, nr. 678, p. 648.). The bishop of Eichstätt was absolved of charges of usury in 
1311 «de plenitudine regie potestatis» (ibidem., nr. 680, p. 649).
10 «Omnia ergo singula supradicta, que pro subditorum quiete duximus ordinanda, retenta nobis 
plenitudine regie potestatis declarandi, mutandi, vel etiam corrigendi, addendi vel minuendi…
volumus observari». Ordonnance pour la réformation des mœurs dans Languedoc et Languedoil, 
published in J. Isambert, Recueil Général des Anciennes Lois Françaises, Paris 1822-33, vol. I, p. 
274. See also A. Gouron, Royal ‘ordonnances’ in medieval France, in Legislation and Justice, ed. 
A. Padoa Schioppa, Oxford 1997, p. 62.
11 Isambert, Recueil cit., vol. II, p. 808; J. Krynen discusses the use of the phrases «certa 
scientia», «auctoritas regia» and «plenitudo potestatis» in French royal ordinances in the 
fourteenth century in «De nostre certaine science… » Remarques sur l’absolutisme legislatif de 
la monarchie medievale Française, in Renaissance du Pouvoir Legislatif et Genèse de l’Etat, eds. 
A. Goron and A. Rigaudiere, Montpellier 1988, pp. 57-69.
12 Isambert, Receuil cit., vol. III, pp. 119 and 151.
13 Quoted in P. Torelli, Capitanato del popolo e vicariato imperiale come elementi costitutivi 
della signoria bonacolsiana, in “Atti e Memorie della R. Accademia Virgiliana di Mantova”, n. s., 
vols. 14-16 (1923), p. 114. The author cites further examples from 1304 and 1305 (p. 115); 1308 
(pp. 116, 118 ) and 1324 (p. 147).
14 G. B. Verci, Storia della Marca Trivigiana e Veronese, Venice, 1786-91, vol. IX, Doc. 950, p. 23.
15 Verci, Storia cit., vol. IX, Doc. 973, p. 55.
16 16 September 1328; the document is published by G. Biadego, Tre documenti Scaligeri 
riguardanti Spinetta Malaspina, in Miscellanea di Studi Storici in onore di Giovanni Sforza, 
Turin 1923, pp. 195f. It is described and reproduced by A. Bartoli Langeli, Diplomi scaligeri, 
in Gli Scaligeri. 1277-1387. Saggi e schede pubblicati in occasione della mostra storico-
Jane Black14
Reti Medievali Rivista, V - 2004/1 <http://www.storia.unifi .it/_RM/rivista/atti/poteri/Black.htm>
documentaria allestita dal Museo de Castelvecchio di Verona, ed. G. M. Varanini, Verona 1988, 
pp. 77 and 195.
17 10 July 1331; Bartoli Langeli, Diplomi, cit., p. 77, reproduced p. 78.
18 Torelli, Capitanato cit., pp. 117ff.
19 «… il maggiore tiranno e ’l più possente e ricco che fosse in Lombardia da Azzolino di Romano 
infi no allora, e chi dice di più» (G. Villani quoted by G. P. Marchi, «Valore e cortesia»: l’immagine 
di Verona e della corte scaligera nella letteratura e nella memoria storica, in Gli Scaligeri cit., 
p. 485.)
20 Quoted by G. M. Varanini, Cangrande Della Scala, DBI, vol. XXXVII, p. 402.
21 G. M. Varanini, Propaganda dei regimi signorili: le esperienze venete del Trecento, in 
La forma della propaganda politica nel Due e nel Trecento. Relazioni tenute al Convegno 
internazionale organizzato dal Comitato di studi storici di Trieste dall’Ecole française di Roma, 
Rome 1994, pp. 314-316.
22 This was vividly described in the poem Bisbidis by Immanuel Romano (Marchi, «Valore e 
cortesia» cit., p. 486; the text is published in the Appendix, pp. 494-495). The dating of the 
description to the 1320s is convincingly argued by G. M. Varanini, Propaganda cit., pp. 322ff.
23 «Nec imperatoriam, regiamve curiam in Longobardiae provincia a referendae memoriae 
tempore ullam auditam, visamve, constabat huic potuisse conferri», cited by P. Rigoli, 
L’esibizione del potere. «Curie» e feste scaligere nelle fonti cronistiche, in Gli Scaligeri cit., p. 
150. Rigoli emphasizes that «una curia ben riuscita dava celebrità al principe quasi quanto una 
vittoria» (ibidem, p. 151); see also Marchi , «Valore e cortesia» cit., p. 487.
24 «El sarà re d’Italia, enançi un anno», cited by A. di Salvo, «Celebrazioni politiche d’occasione»: 
il caso dei primi Scaligeri, in La forma della propaganda politica cit., p. 297.
25 This was said by the the anonymous Roman in his Cronica (Di Salvo, «Celebrazioni politiche 
d’occasione» cit., p. 297); the account of the crown appears in other chronicles and it is said that 
Azzone was dismayed by his rival’s presumption (F. Cognasso L’unifi cazione della Lombardia 
sotto Milano in Storia di Milano, vol. V, Milan 1955, p. 275).
26 Studies on the della Scala chancery show that their staff were consciously attempting to refl ect 
the lofty status of their masters (Bartoli Langeli, Diplomi cit., p. 82). Bartoli Langeli stresses in 
this context the signifi cance of the reference to the Scaligeri’s plenitudo potestatis. 
27 C. Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., p.1. He had to hand over 12,000 gold fl orins per month 
in addition to paying the salaries of the 200 members of the emperor’s entourage in Italy.
28 On the occasion of the Corpus Christi celebrations in 1335, for example, there was, according 
to the chronicler Galvano Fiamma, an outburst of splendour, including a procession of 100,000 
people and a sumptuous banquet (Opusculum de rebus gestis ab Azone, Luchino et Johanne 
Vicecomitibus ab anno MCCCXXVIII usque ad annum MCCCXLII, ed. C. Castiglioni, Bologna 
1938, RIS, vol. XII, parte 4, p. 19.
29 Fiamma, Opusculum cit., p. 16.
30 Fiamma, Opusculum cit., p. 17. G. Creighton convincingly demonstrated that the fresco 
described by Fiamma was the work of Giotto (The fresco by Giotto in Milan, in “Arte Lombarda”, 
1977, pp. 47-48). The signifi cance of Azzone’s artistic patronage in terms of «evoking the quality 
of princely greatness» is shown by L. Green in Galvano Fiamma, Azzone Visconti and the revival 
of the classical theory of magnifi cence, in “Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes”, vol. 
LIII (1990), pp. 98-113.
31 B. Biondelli, La zecca e le monete di Milano, Milan, 1869, p. 111; P. Verri, Storia di Milano, 
Milan 1834-1850, vol. I, p. 390: «Azone fu il primo che veramente fosse sovrano; e laddove 
nessuno dei Torriani, nè Ottone Visconti, nè Matteo, nè Galeazzo I ardirono mai di porre il loro 
nome nella moneta, la quale anzi sempre fu coniata o col nome solo di Milano e di Sant’Ambrogio, 
ovvero coll’aggiunta del nome del Re dei Romani o dell’imperatore… ».
32 In 1335, for example, when Como was handed to Azzone by Franchino Rusca, the commune 
issued coins which for the fi rst time boasted the name of their signore. There were to be thirteen 
such in the four years before Azzone’s death (Corpus nummorum Italicorum, vol. IV, Rome 1913, 
pp. 183-185). 
33 Quoted by Torelli, Capitanato cit., pp. 114ff.
34 He was given «merum et purum imperium et jurisdictionem, dominium, potestatem, 
signoraticum et liberum arbitrium» (the document is published in E. Salzer, Ueber die Anfänge 
der Signorie in Oberitalien, Berlin 1900, pp. 302-303). On this aspect of arbitrium, see, for 
15
Reti Medievali Rivista, V - 2004/1 <http://www.storia.unifi .it/_RM/rivista/atti/poteri/Black.htm>
The Visconti in the Fourteenth Century
example, G. Sandri, Il vicariato imperiale e gli inizi della signoria scaligera in Vicenza, in 
“Archivio Veneto”, a. IX (1932), p. 77; G. De Vergottini, Signorie e principati, in Scritti di storia 
del diritto italiano, ed. G. Rossi, vol. II, Milan 1977, pp. 654ff; F. Ercole, Comuni e signori nel 
Veneto (Scaligeri, Caminesi e Carraresi), in Dal comune al principato. Saggi sulla storia del 
diritto pubblico del rinascimento italiano, Florence 1929, p. 106; C. Storti Storchi, Aspetti 
generali della legislazione statutaria Lombardia in età viscontea, in Legislazione e società 
nell’Italia medievale per il VII centenario degli statuti di Albenga, Atti del Convegno, Bordighera 
1990, pp. 78-79; M. Meccarelli, «Arbitrium». Un aspetto sistematico degli ordinamenti giuridici 
in età di diritto comune, Milan 1998, pp. 186ff.
35 Verci, Storia cit., vol. IX, Doc. 950, p. 23.
36 G. B. Picotti, I Caminesi e la loro signoria in Treviso dal 1283 al 1312, Livorno 1905, p. 229 
and Doc. 53, p. 301.
37 Verci, Storia cit., vol. IX, Doc. 973, p. 55. 
38 G. Sandri, Il vicariato cit., p. 101; for the provision of the general council of Vicenza, 27 
February 1312, see pp. 113-114.
39 Bartoli Langeli, Diplomi cit., p. 78.
40 26 September 1334, (Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., p. 7).
41 Lo Statuto di Bergamo del 1353 cit., p. 357.
42 Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., pp. 18-19. In 1341 Giovanni and Luchino granted a tax 
rebate to the city of Piacenza «de nostre plenitudine potestatis et omni nostra auctoritate» 
(Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., p. 24). 
43 «Quod reddatur ius subditis dominorum non obstante quod non subeant onera» (23 May 
1343), Antiqua ducum Mediolanum decreta, Milan 1654, p. 1.
44 Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., p. 2.
45 E.g. James of Viterbo, De regimine Christiano (ed. H.-X. Arquillière, Le plus ancien traité de 
l’Eglise, Jacques de Viterbe, «De regimine Christiano» [1301-1302], Paris 1926), p. 268.
46 Watt, The Use of the term cit., p. 176; Benson, Plenitudo potestatis cit., pp. 197 n. 3 and 210.
47 Krynen, «De nostre certaine science» cit., p. 137 n. 25.
48 G. B. Ladner, The concepts of « ecclesia» and «Christianitas» and their relation to the idea 
of papal « plenitudo potestatis» from Gregory VII to Boniface VIII, in Images and Ideas in 
the Middle Ages: Selected Studies in History and Art, vol. II, Rome 1983 (originally published 
in Sacerdozio e Regno da Gregorio VII a Bonifacio VIII (Miscellanea Historiae Pontifi ciae 18, 
Rome 1954), p. 511. 
49 E.g. Sententia diffi nitiva contra Regem Robertum Siciliae per Henricum Imperatorem lata, 
26 April 1313, in G. Doenniges, Acta Henrici VII, pars I, Berlin 1839, p. 200.
50 E.g. Scriptum de privilegiis concedendis, 9 September 1310 (MGH, Legum Sectio IV, 
Constitutiones IV, part i, p. 373); Encyclica italicis missa, 13 September 1310 (ibidem, p. 389); 
Cassatio repressaliarum, 12 September 1311 (ibidem, p. 648).
51 Louis IX’s Ordonnance pour la réformation des moeurs dans le Languedoc et la Languedoil, 
December 1254 (Isambert, Receuil cit., vol. I, p. 274); Philip IV’s Etablissment portant défense 
des guerres privées, 9 January 1303 (Isambert, Receuil cit., vol. II, p. 808).
52 E. Besta maintained «Attraverso il vicariato il signore acquistò la facoltà di esercitare la 
plenitudo potestatis» (Il diritto pubblico italiano dagli inizi del secolo decimoprimo alla seconda 
metà del secolo decimoquinto, Padua 1929, p. 299).
53 Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., p. 1. The 1311 diploma to Cangrande appears to come 
closest to a grant of plenitude of power: the document itself does not survive, but in the statutes 
issued under his name in Verona in 1328, Cangrande is described as having obtained from 
Henry VII «merum et mixtum imperium ac plenissimam potestatem et iurisdictionem» (F. 
Ercole, Impero e Papato nel diritto pubblico italiano del Rinascimento (secc. XIV-XV) in 
Dal comune cit., p. 287, n. 2). But plenissima potestas did not have the same connotations as 
plenitudo potestatis.
54 There was only the title briefl y held from John of Bohemia in 1331 (G. Biscaro, Le relazioni dei 
Visconti di Milano con la Chiesa. Giovanni XXII ed Azzone, in “Archivio Storico Lombardo”, ser. 
V, a. XLVI [1919], p. 208 n. 1).
55 Biscaro, Le relazioni cit., p. 145; Cognasso, L’unifi cazione cit., p. 217.
56 «… ea in toto vel in parte cassandi, irritandi et eis addendi, minuendi, mutandi, supplendi, 
corrigendi, interpretandi et declarandi secundum quod ei videbitur expedire». The account is 
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published by F. Cognasso, Note e documenti sulla formazione dello stato visconteo, in “Bollettino 
della società pavese di storia patria”, a. XXIII, 1923, Doc. 3, pp. 123-128.
57 «Insuper liberum et generale arbitrium et bailiam faciendi per se vel alios, ut predicitur, ultra, 
contra, citra, vel preter formam statutuorum dicte civitatis, imponendi penas et banna, leges 
condendi, pecunias dicti comunis expendendi, statuta. reformationes et privilegia faciendi…
quicquid ipse dominus per litteras, vel alio modo, iuxerit vel statuerit sit et intelligatur esse lex et 
pro lege perpetuo ab eis debeat observari» (Statuti di Como del 1335. Volumen magnum, vol. I, 
ed. G. Manganelli, Como 1936, p. 17)
58 «Quicquid decreverit idem dominus Azo de civitate et districtu Vercellarum… sit validum 
et fi rmum et lex communis Vercellarum. Et pro statutis et decretis communis Vercellarum 
habeantur et teneantur ac si tunc foret ordinatum per commune Vercellarum.… et quod habeat 
et habere debeat plenam et liberam potestatem et bayliam ordinandi statuendi legem et leges 
condendi et statuta faciendi secundum et eo modo ut habet et habuit et habere potest commune 
Vercellarum… non obstantibus aliquibus statutis, ordinamentibus, provisionibus, consciliis et 
legibus in contrarium facientibus», 26 September 1335 (Statuta Communis Vercellarum ab anno 
mcccxli, in Monumenta Historiae Patriae XVI, Leges Municipales, vol. II part 2, Turin 1876, 
Appendix sexta et postrema, coll. 1503-4).
59 The discussion opens with the question whether the emperor has the right to legitimize 
fatherless children (spurios) «quia ex plenitudine potestatis dispensatio procedit». He concludes: 
«sed electo a populo per legem regiam, omne ius utriusque potestas competit merito, et electo 
a principibus competit… Et sic cum eadem iurisdictione fungatur quia Iustinianus lege non 
tenetur, ut lex “digna vox”. Et sic patet quod iurisdictionem habet legitimandi et privilegium 
concedendi cum iurisdictionem et potestatem imperialem obtineat… » (C. 7, 37, 3 De quadrennii 
praescriptione, l. Bene a Zenone, nr. 4).
60 Defensor Pacis, Bk 3, ii, 13: «No ruler, and still less any partial group or individual person of 
whatever status, has plenitude of control or power over the individual or civil acts of other persons 
without the determination of the mortal legislator» (trans. A. Gewirth , Marsilius of Padua: the 
Defender of Peace, New York 1951-6, vol. II, p. 427 in the Medieval Academy of America reprint). 
Gewirth explains that according to Marsilius, «the legislator possesses, and hence can grant, 
such plenitude; so that Marsilius’ republicanism as to the source of power is coupled with an 
absolutism as to the extent of power» (vol. I, pp. 257-258). L. Mayali suggests that the same idea 
was current in France (Lex animata. Rationalisation du pouvoir politique et science juridique 
[XIIème-XIVème siècles], in Renaissance du Pouvoir cit., p. 162 and n. 50). 
61 «Omne enim ius condendi leges vel canones populus contulit in imperatorem et ecclesia in 
apostolicum unde intelligitur uterque plenitudinem potestatis quo ad hoc… » (Summa ad dist. 4 
c.3, quoted by B. Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory. The Contribution of the Medieval 
Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism, Cambridge 1955, p. 145 n. 2).
62 «… ex arbitrio suo et plenitudine potestatis eidem solemniter concessis et attributis per 
comune Mantue»’ (quoted by Torelli, Capitanato cit., p. 118). Similarly in the following year 
Rinaldo Bonacolsi authorized a procurator to act for him in negotiations with Verona and other 
cities «ex arbitrio et plenitudine potestatis sibi per Comune et Universitatem Mantue sollemniter 
attributis» (19 march 1309). The document is published by C. Cipolla, Documenti per la storia 
delle relazioni diplomatiche fra Verona e Mantua nel secolo XIV, in Miscellanea di Storia 
Veneta, ser. II, vol. XII, parte 1, Venice 1907, Doc. 78, pp. 204-205. 
63 «… ex arbitrio suo et plenitudine potestatis quibus fungitur in partibus supradictis, eidem 
collatis per communia, homines et consilia civitatum predictarum» (cited by Torelli, Capitanato 
cit., p. 147).
64 L. A. Muratori, Delle antichità estensi ed italiane, Modena 1718-40, vol. II, p. 97: «et sit 
statutum precixum comunis Mutine cum omni baylia et plenitudine potestatis et arbitrii in ipsos 
Dominos Marchiones collacta per comune Mutine».
65 This appeared in the document confi rming the privileges given by Bartolomeo, bishop of 
Verona, to the monastery of S. Cassiano, «de nostre plenitudine potestatis et arbitrii quod et quam 
in civitate et diocesi ac districtu Verone, divina disponente clementia et per statuta Comunis et 
Populi Verone dignoscimur obtinere» (Bartoli Langeli, Diplomi cit., pp. 78 and 82).
66 Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., pp. 99-100.
67 Examples from the years 1355-1360 can be found in Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., pp. 
103, 106, 108, 109, 110, 116.
68 There was a grant of 29 December 1357 from «nos Bernabos et Galeaz fratres Vicecomites 
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civitatum Mediolani etcetera, sacri Romani imperii vicarii generales» (Santoro, La politica 
fi nanziaria cit., p. 113); on 22 February 1359 Galeazzo wrote to the podestà of Bobbio as «Nos 
Galeaz Vicecomes Mediolani etc. imperialis vicarius generalis» (Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria 
cit., p. 115).
69 That is except where the proper name of the sender was not used, as in dominus Mediolani etc. 
Imperialis Vicarius generalis. Occasionally the two styles appear together, as in the 1369 statute 
facilitating the sale of property which referred to «domini Bernabos et Galeaz, fratres Vicecomites 
Mediolani etc. imperiales vicarii et Domini generales» (Antiqua ducum cit., p. 34).
70 Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., p. 109.
71 12 February 1366 (Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria cit., p. 160). 
72 The double reference refl ected the nature of Bernabò’s diploma: it concerned lands over which 
he wished to make his wife outright ruler but where he exercised a confusing variety of titles 
(G. Bonelli, A proposito dei beni di Beatrice della Scala nella Calciana, in “Archivio Storico 
Lombardo”, ser. III, vol. XIX, a. XXX, [1903], p. 132 and Doc. 5, p. 140; F.E. Comani, Sui domini 
di Regina della Scala e dei suoi fi gli, in “Archivio Storico Lombardo”, ser. III, vol. XVII, a. XXIX 
[1902], pp. 232ff). Bernabò listed his claims to authority over the lands: «… damus, concedimus et 
traddimus quicquid ad nos sive tamquam nostrum alodium sive iure dominationis, dignitatis vel 
vicariatus pertinet, sive etiam ad aliquas civitates et terras vel loca nostro dominio subiecta vel ad 
imperialem celsitudinem, cuius vices gerimus in partibus istis» (Santoro, La politica fi nanziaria 
cit., p. 160). 
73 «… dumtamen in nostra et sacri imperii fi de et obedientia persistatis» (Santoro, La politica 
fi nanziaria cit., p. 98).
74 D. M. Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan (1351-1402). A study in the 
political career of an Italian despot, Cambridge 1941, p. 26. The diploma is reproduced in J. 
Dumont, Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens, Amsterdam 1726, vol. II, part 1, pp. 
145-147.
75 A. De Circourt, Le Duc Louis d’Orléans, frère de Charles VI, ses enterprises en Italie (1392-
1396), in “Revue des Questions Historiques” (1 January, 1889), p. 81.
76 Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo cit., p. 174; C. Cantù, Gian Galeazzo Visconti, in “Archivio 
Storico Lombardo”, ser. II, vol. IV, a. XIV (1887), pp. 465-467.
77 Dumont cit., p. 237: «Decernentes et hoc Romano Regio statuentes edicto quod tu, heredes 
et successores tui perpetuo Duces et principes civitatis et diœcesis Mediolanensis nominari et 
appellari debeatis et tanquam caeteri imperii duces et principes teneri et honorari et utique 
ab ominbus reputari, omnique tunc privilegio, honore, gratia, dignitate et immunitate absque 
impedimento perfrui quibus alii Sacro-Sancti Imperii duces et principes in dandis sive recipiendis 
juribus, in conferendis seu suscipiendis feudis et omnibus aliis illustrem statum et conditionem 
ducum sive principum concernentibus fruiti sunt hactenus… ».
78 Published in J. C Luenig, Codex Italiae diplomaticus, Frankfort and Leipzig 1725-35, vol. I, cols 
425-432.
79 Luenig cit., vol. I, col. 429: «… et alia gerere, facere et expedire in ducatibus Mediolani etc 
praedictis, quod nos et Romani Reges et Imperatores gerere, facere et expedire possemus, etiam 
de plenitudine potestatis… ».
80 G. Dati, Cronaca: «… egli ebbe dall’imperadore una carta biancha di pergameno col suggello 
pendente dello imperio da potervi fare poi scrivere quello che avesse voluto… » (Cited in G. 
Romano, Gian Galeazzo Visconti e gli eredi di Bernabò, in “Archivio Storico Lombardo”, ser. II, 
vol. VIII, a. XVIII [1891], p. 303, n. 2).
81 M. Campi, Dell’historia ecclesiastica di Piacenza, Piacenza 1666-7, vol. III, p. 307: «Nos qui 
ducalem sane nostram monarchiam desideramus scientiis ac virtutibus facundare et huiusmodi 
veris ornamentis fulcire, non immerito, motu proprio, de nostrae plenitudine potestatis a 
Caesarea dignitate nobis, et nostris successoribus attributa, Deo auctore, et de certa scientia, 
et omnimodo quo melius possumus, duximus in civitate nostra Placentiae generale studium 
instaurandum». The same phrase appears a few weeks later in a decree against corrupt offi cials 
which Giangaleazzo issued «motu proprio, ex certa scientia, et de nostra plenitudine potestatis 
nutu divino a Caesare dignitatis nobis concessae» (Antiqua ducum cit., p. 225).
82 He had spent most of the 1330s working for Azzone Visconti, helping to reestablish his position 
and to reorganize the Visconti dominions, as well as undertaking missions on his behalf to the 
papal court (L. Prosdocimi, Alberico da Rosate, DBI, vol. I, pp. 656f).
83 Albericus de Rosate, In primam Digesti Veteris partem commentaria, Venice 1585, reprinted 
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Bologna 1979, ad Const. Omnem, nr. 13 (omitting his citations): «Aliquando imperator exercet 
iurisdictionem imperialem legem condendo, et tunc transfert dominium; quandocunque ex lege 
immediate et ubicunque lex inducit confi scationem bonorum; quandoque mediante sententia vel 
contractu et tunc idem; quandoque imperialem iurisdictionem iudicialiter exercendo, et tunc 
idem ut transferat dominium de uno in alium, nam hoc etiam facit quilibet iudex ex faciendo 
decretum et dividendo, et hoc verum si res sit illius contra quem exercet iurisdictionem, alias 
secus; aut rescriptum concedendo, et non potest, propter legem derogatoriam, C. De precibus 
imperatori offerendis l. Quoties et l. Rescripta [C. 1, 19, 2 and 7]».
84 Albericus, ad Const. Omnem, nr. 13: «Et hoc nisi in rescripto vellet uti plenitudine potestatis, 
dicendo non obstante tali lege vel aliqua lege, ut nota dicta l. Quoties».
85 Albericus, ad C.1, 19, 2 (De precibus imperatori offerendis l. Quoties), nr. 1: «Rescriptum quod 
ex toto tollit ius alterius vel quod nimium laedit, non est concedendum».
86 See K. Pennington, The Prince and the Law 1200-1600. Sovereignty and Rights in the 
Western Legal Tradition, Berkeley 1993, pp. 113ff; 130ff; E. Cortese, Il problema della sovranità 
nel pensiero giuridico medioevale, Rome 1966, pp 142ff; U. Nicolini, La proprietà, il principe e 
l’espropriazione per pubblica utilità. Studi sulla dottrina giuridica intermedia, Milan 1952, pp. 
132ff.
87 A. Lattes, Due giureconsulti milanesi, Signorolo e Signorino degli Omodei, in “Rendiconti 
dell’Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere”, ser. II, vol. XXXII (1899), pp. 1017-1021.
88 Signorolus de Homodeis, Consilia, Milan 1521, 70 (In quaestione vertente). The details of the 
dispute are explained by G. Dolezalek, I commentari di Odofredo e Baldo alla Pace di Costanza, 
in La pace di Costanza, 1183: un diffi cile equilibrio di poteri fra società italiana ed impero, 
Bologna 1984, p. 63, nr. 14. The Visconti took over Parma only in 1346 but, since the date of the 
case is unclear, it is not known which of the Visconti was involved.
89 Signorolus, Consilia cit., 70 (In quaestione vertente), nr. 22: «Sed his non obstantibus, 
dicendum est contrarium primo quod ex tenore commissionis facte per prefatum dominum cuius 
forma fuit secuta comparitio predicti sindici et dictam comparitionem fecit, et ad executionem 
sue commissionis seu voluntatem predicti domini que inter suos subditos est servanda ut 
Institutiones, De iure naturali et gentium et civili, l. sed quod principi [Inst. 1, 2, 6]».
90 On the circumscribed nature of Visconti legislative powers in this period see C. Storti Storchi, 
Aspetti della condizione giuridica dello straniero negli statuti lombardi dei secoli XIV-XV, in 
“Archivio Storico Lombardo”, ser. XI, vol. II, a. CXI (1985), pp. 62ff and Ead., Aspetti generali 
cit., pp. 93ff.
91 Signorolus, Consilia cit., 89 (Presupponitur infrascriptum statutum), nn. 8-9: «Nec fi at ratio 
de istis litteris ad similitudinem iuris municipalis, cum reputari debeant tanquam lex generalis; 
primo propter auctoritatem condentis ut lex iii § divus, Dig. De sepulchro violato [D. 47, 12, 3]; 
secundo propter eius formam et hoc dupliciter, primo quia nomen edicti est insertum, secundo 
quia per cunctos subditos fuerunt promulgate ut l. ii C. De legibus et constitutionibus principum 
[C 1, 14, 2]… Appareat bone memorie dominum Luchinum voluisse terras dominio suo subditas, 
et alias separatam iurisdictionem habentes, in hoc venire, et ut adinvicem unitatem habeant 
videlicet respectu banni… Non erit novum si in his habentibus unitatem et connexitatem ad 
invicem sub dominio prefati domini respectu banni, extensi fi at de uno loco ad alium… ». 
92 Signorolus, Consilia cit., 82 (In questionibus vertentibus), nr. 12: «Mandavit enim dominus 
Mediolani MCCCL, die xii Augusti ex certa scientia et ex plenitudine potestatis sue qualiter 
approbabat venditionem seu locationem factam de datio vini imbotati… ».
93 Signorolus, Consilia cit., 82 (In questionibus vertentibus), nr. 6: «Cum ergo sit verum et 
notorium in quacunque parte Lombardie quod [ed.: cives] pacifi cus status cuiuscunque civitatis 
conservatur armorum podio et intuitu ministrorum ipsorum armorum qui sunt stipendiarii 
necessario concluditur huiusmodi onera in civitatibus vigentia et que tendunt ad solutionem 
talium ministrorum imminere ob necessitatem utilitatis publice et pro tanto ab ipsis iuxta 
occurrentia temporibus nostris religiosas domos non esse immunes maxime quia propter talium 
ministratorum solicitudines status religiosarum domorum in civitatibus conservatur. Equitas 
ergo dictat ab ipsis in ipsorum stipendiis debere conferri… ».
94 This is not to say that Signorolus was deliberately following Bartolus’s lead: he rarely refered to 
Bartolus’s work and was not much impressed by it (A. Lattes, Due giureconsulti cit., p. 1041).
95 Baldus de Ubaldis, In usus feudorum commentaria, Lyon 1552, Proœmium, § Aliqua, Sed 
pauca de principe dicamus, nr. 34: «Ea tamen quae facit praesumiter facere decenter et non ex 
plenitudine potestatis». The dictinction between morality and plenitudo potestatis is discussed 
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by U. Nicolini, La proprietà cit,. pp. 137-138, 140, 143 and by N. Cortese, La norma giuridica. 
Spunti teorici nel diritto comune classico, Milan 1962-4, vol. II, pp. 277-278.
96 Baldus de Ubaldis, In primum, secundum et tertium Codicis libros commentarii, Venice 1577, 
ad C. 3, 34, 2 (De servitutibus et de aqua, l. Si aqua), nr. 45: «Est autem plenitudo potestatis 
arbitrii plenitudo nulli necessitati subiecta nullisque iuris publici regulis limitata… In principi 
sedes libertatis est, et potest praeferre magis aequo minus aequum et magis bono minus bonum, 
nam cum non sit obligatus ad aliquid, potest eligere sicut placet».
97 J. Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, Cambridge 1987, pp. 223-225; 
Id., Permanence and change in Baldus’ political thought, in “Ius Commune. Zeitschrift für 
Europäische Rechtesgeschichte, Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte, Frankfurt am Main”, vol. XXVII, VI. Centenario della morte di Baldo degli 
Ubaldi, Frankfurt 2000, pp. 292-293.
98 Baldus de Ubaldis, Consiliorum sive responsorum volumen primum… quintum, Venice 1575 
(reprinted Turin 1970), vol. I, 267 (Ad evidentiam praemitto), nr. 9: «Secundo praemitto ad 
evidentiam habere plenitudinem potestatis in temporalibus competit soli imperatori vel libero 
regi in regno suo ut ff. De captivis, l. hostes [D. 49, 15, 24]. Inferioribus autem non competit iure 
ordinariae potestatis, sed bene possunt habere ex speciali privilegio, puta si vicariatus est eis 
collatus cum plenitudine potestatis. Nam quod princeps potest per se potest per alium sicut quotidie 
videmus in comitibus… Quia igitur plenitudo potestatis extra omnem iurisdictionem territorii 
consistit in privilegio, oportet de tali privilegio constare per privilegium principis vel inveteratam 
consuetudinem…  ».
99 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 267 (Ad evidentiam praemitto), nr. 9: «Sed tamen quia omnes 
domini Lombardiae de consuetudine usuali et quasi de quadam theorica et practica ponunt hic 
verba “de plenitudine potestatis” et sunt in quasi possessione verbi et facti, puto, salva substantia 
veritatis, credendum eorum sermoni; quia non est verisimile quod falsa voce uterentur… ».
100 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 267 (Ad evidentiam praemitto), nr. 9: «Alioquin multis 
praeteritis possent lites excitari, et quaecunque et quantumcunque bona sopita resolvi, quod est 
iniquum ut C. De summa trinitate, l. 3 [C. 1,1, 3]. Et illusoria fi erent decreta tantorum dominorum 
ut ff. De iudiciis, l. si praetor, in principio[D. 5, 1, 75]… Semper enim praesupposui plenitudinem 
potestatis, putans sermones tanti domini esse iuridicos [«veridicos» in other editions]». See 
Canning, The Political Thought cit., p. 224.
101 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 345 (Ad evidentiam), nr. 2: «… si auctoritate rescripti unus 
Baro occuparet rem alterius, tenetur ei restituere cum fructibus… ».
102 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 345 (Ad evidentiam), nr. 1: «Sed non posset imperator dare 
licentiam quod quis posset propria autoritate expellere iustum et legitimum possessorem, quia 
talis licentia contineret fl agitium et delictum».
103 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 345 (Ad evidentiam), nr. 1: «Nec obstat clausula “de 
plenitudine potestatis” quia illa clausula intelligitur de plenitudine potestatis bonae et laudabilis, 
non vituperabilis vel tyrannicae. Nam non dicitur imperator posse nisi quod de iure potest. Item 
nihil operantur illa verba “ex certa scientia” quia immo magis sunt apta ad expressionem maioris 
delicti. Et ideo ista temeraria et abusive cautela, qua hodie principes utuntur in suis rescriptis, 
deberent in totum radicari ab aula nec ita in usu frequentari». Regarding my translation of «ista 
cautela», it must refer to both phrases, and not just to «ex certa scientia» since these expressions 
were used together in this as in so many instances and it was the expedient as a whole that Baldus 
dislikes. In the sixteenth century Aymo Cravetta read the passage as if Baldus meant that it was 
particularly the phrase plenitudo potestatis which should be banned: «Allego Baldus in Consilio 
345, “Ad evidentiam praemittendum est, quod imperator,” col. 2, libr. 1 ubi quod clausula de 
plenitudine potestatis intelligitur de potestate bona et laudabili non vituperabili vel tirannica; 
nam non dicitur imperator posse nisi quod de iure potest et quod ista temeraria et abusive 
cautela, qua hodie principes utuntur in suis rescriptis, deberet in totum radicari ab aula nec ita in 
usu frequentari secundum eum» (Consiliorum Aymonis Cravettae, Venice 1566, 241, nr. 20).
104 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 253 (Illustris dominus noster), nr. 1: «Et sic Benentonus 
tenetur ad restitutionem dictae domus… cum creditor agens sit prior tempore, constat, quod 
potior in iure, ut in regula “quod prior” [C. 8, 17, 3]».
105 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 253 (Illustris dominus noster), nn. 3-4: «Sed ipse Benentonius 
possedit bona fi de et cum decreto principis, immo plus videtur dicendum, quod ubi intervenit 
decretum non requiratur bona fi des… Sed princeps ex causa potest tollere dominium, ergo fortius 
hypothecam ut ff. De legatis 2, l. peto, § praedium [D. 31, 69]. Praeterea in donatione sunt haec 
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verba “ex certa scientia et de plenitudine potestatis” et quando apponuntur ista verba, instar 
sacrilegii est infringere, supposita potestate concedentis».
106 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 253 (Illustris dominus noster), § 4: «Quaestio ista dubitabilis 
est, pro prima parte facit aequitas; pro seconda suprema potestas… Ego aliter in ista causa non 
consulo quia tangit interesse magnifi ci domini nostri et eius determinatio pertinet ad consilium 
iustitiae non ad me».
107 Baldus, In primum cit., Ad C 4, 52, 2 (De communium rerum alienatione, l. Multum): «Nota 
tamen quod licet princeps habeat plenitudinem potestatis, raro debet ea uti magis cavere se debet 
princeps quam alius… ».
108 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 333 (Ad intelligentiam sequendorum), nr. 1, referring to the 
emperor: «tanta est in eo plenitudo potestatis quod legibus solutus est… licet de plenitudine 
honestatis teneatur habere fi rmas concessiones suas»; see Cortese, La norma cit., vol. I, p. 161. 
It was an axiom that «he who has supreme power should act on the highest principles (honestas) 
and with the greatest fairness» (Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. IV, 19 [Factum sic proponuntur], 
nr. 3: «… qui enim tenet supremam potestatem debet observare summam honestatem et 
summam aequitatem… ». It was Cynus who had emphasized in his comment on the l. Digna vox 
that «morality binds even the prince»; and Baldus transcribed Cynus’s «precious lecture» word-
for-word in Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. III, 371 (Verba Cyni).
109 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 262 (Recolo me consuluisse), nr. 2: «Item si quis vellet 
revocare in dubium potestatem dominorim, evacuaret omnem virtutem eorum et ego non essem 
istius consilii qui vellem evangare mundum».
110 Baldus, Consiliorum cit., vol. I, 333 (Ad intelligentiam), nr. 1: «Tamen si aliquod motivum, 
etiam leve, movet principem de plenitudine potestatis facere potest quod ei libet».
